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Much of the recent literature on democratic transitions from authoritarian rule has 
stressed the importance of regime disunity in the early stages of the transition. For example, 
Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter have written:* 2
. . .  there is no transition whose beginning is not the consequence—direct or indirect—of 
important divisions within the authoritarian regime itself, principally along the fluctuat­
ing cleavage between hard-liners and soft-liners.
Similarly, Adam Przeworski argues:3
Where some perspectives of an "opening" (apertura, "thaw") have appeared, they have 
always involved some ruling groups that sought political support amongst forces until 
that moment excluded from politics by the authoritarian regime. This is not to say that 
once liberalisation is initiated, only such chosen partners are politically mobilised: once 
the signal is given, a wave of popular mobilisation often ensues. But it seems to me that 
the first critical threshold in the transition to democracy is precisely the move by some 
group within the ruling bloc to obtain support from sources external to it.
* This article is based on a paper presented to the Asian Studies Association of Australia Biennial Conference in 
Perth, July 13-16,1994, and was written mainly in May 1994. Information in it is largely drawn from fieldwork 
carried out between March 1993 and March 1994 in Jakarta and other towns in Java. All unattributed quotations 
are from interviews carried out with student activists during this time. For obvious reasons, informants are not 
identified and many details in descriptions of events which would assist their identification or that of the groups 
that they belong to have been omitted. My thanks to the Indonesian student activists who discussed their ex­
periences with me, and to Harold Crouch and Ben Kerkvliet for their comments.
2 Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about 
Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1986), p. 19.
3Adam Przeworski, "Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy," in Transitions from Authori­
tarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives, ed. O'Donnell et al., p. 56.
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In recent years Indonesian politics have seemingly been marked by some of these char­
acteristics.
On the one hand, there has been partly hidden, but sometimes bitter, friction between 
elements in the military and the president (along with the "palace group" more broadly). A 
process of limited liberalization has taken place. This in turn has been accompanied by an 
increase in public criticism and dissent, most obvious in the reemergence of public protest 
and (at least until mid-1994) a relatively vocal press. This article examines the relationship 
between intra-regime disunity and civilian dissent by focusing on one section of the civilian 
opposition: student activist groups. It examines their relationship with military elements, 
and the strategic debates amongst them which have been prompted by perceived conflict 
"at the top." The focus is on the period from late 1988 to early 1994.
Friction in the Military
Dissatisfaction within the officer corps of ABRI (the Indonesian Armed Forces) in recent 
years has been linked with a range of disparate issues, including sudden or "unfair" promo­
tions and transfers, "scapegoating" of the military for human rights violations, and interfer­
ence by non-military politicians in purchases of armaments and equipment. This has often 
been combined with resentment at the increasing wealth and assertiveness of the Suharto 
family and their associates, and has all occurred in the atmosphere of tension associated 
with anticipation of the long awaited presidential succession. Underlying such grumbles 
have been three main factors: first, various long-term processes of political and economic 
change; second, generational change in the military; and, third, the role of the Benny Moer- 
dani network.
In the first place, there has been a long-term, albeit gradual, decline in the role played by 
the military in the New Order regime.4 Whereas in the early 1970s the military more or less 
constituted government, since the 1980s a growing gap has become apparent, symbolized 
graphically by the minimal military representation in the Sixth Development Cabinet an­
nounced in March 1993. Although the military as an institution remains very powerful, 
government is increasingly legitimated by civilian mechanisms, more civilians have been 
moving into its top levels, and the institutional interests of the military less and less occupy 
a central part in policy formulation:
ABRI has become increasingly an instrument carrying out general policies which it has 
no real say in formulating. The Suharto regime is not a military regime but a militarist 
regime—it uses military force to rule but the interests of the military as a social or politi­
cal group are not its first concern.5
The growing political marginalization of the military at the upper echelons of govern­
ment reflects the expanding power of the "notables" centered on the Suharto family and the 
families of other senior bureaucrats.6 Over the New Order period, using their access to 
strategic positions in the state, these groups have engaged in massive capital accumulation.
4 For discussions of this process, see for example: Harold Crouch "Democratic Prospects in Indonesia," in 
Democracy in Indonesia: 1950s and 1990s, ed. David Bourchier and John Legge (Clayton: Monash University 
Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994), pp. 120-23; Max Lane, 'Openness,' Political Discontent and Succession in 
Indonesia: Political Developments in Indonesia, 1989-1991 (Brisbane: Griffith University, Australia-Asia Paper No. 
56,1991), pp. 4-16.
5 Lane, 'Openness,' Political Discontent and Succession in Indonesia, p. 7.
6 The term "notables" is introduced by Richard Robison in "Organising the Transition: Indonesian Politics in 
1993/94" in Indonesia Assessment 1994 (Canberra: Australian National University, 1994), p. 52.
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Under the economic deregulation which began in the mid-1980s they have been handed 
control over increasingly large parts of the economy. This process has speeded the dis­
placement of the military from the commanding heights of the economy, with military-con­
trolled foundations and state enterprises playing an ever more minor role. Richard Robison, 
for instance, notes that in the late 1980s " . . .  the military's lucrative forestry and transport 
monopolies had largely evaporated as better capitalised conglomerates and new family en­
terprises moved in."7 The notables have also begun to play a more active political role, as 
evidenced by the inclusion of two of Suharto's children in the new Golkar Central Executive 
Board chosen at the 1993 congress.8 These developments—the increasing prominence of the 
Suharto family and other notables, as well as the military's apparently sliding political and 
economic position—have caused considerable concern and resentment within at least parts 
of the officer corps.
The generational change which took place in the military during the 1980s has also exac­
erbated tensions between the President and elements in the officer corps. In the early New 
Order period, the military was led by Suharto's contemporaries from the 1945 generation. 
Officers like Ali Moertopo, Soedjono Hoemardani, Widodo, Panggabean, Mohammad 
Yusuf, and Yoga Sugama had been Suharto's comrades-in-arms through the struggle for in­
dependence, and the periods of parliamentary and guided democracy. They had participat­
ed with him (and in some cases directly under his command) in the overthrow of Sukarno 
and the establishment of the New Order. Although Suharto was unquestionably the 
supreme power in the New Order (and pushed aside 1945 generation officers when neces­
sary), at least he considered them his peers, consulted with them, and valued their opinions. 
During the 1980s, the older generation was succeeded by officers trained at the Military 
Academy (AMN) in Magelang in the 1960s. There is a much greater gap between the presi­
dent and these officers. Not only are they a full generation younger than he but they have 
had very different experiences, having seen active service almost entirely under the New 
Order. It is safe to assume that he trusts them less, and values their skills less. This accounts 
for the prominence of former presidential adjutants, relatives, and their proteges in recent 
promotions, especially to the most powerful and sensitive positions.9
The final factor which has had a decisive impact on the character of tensions has been 
the role of Benny Moerdani and his network. The Indonesian Armed Forces has always 
been permeated by informal networks, but that built around Moerdani was particularly 
powerful and pervasive. During the 1970s, Moerdani attained a position of extraordinary 
power by his dominance of the military intelligence network, the linchpin of New Order 
control. He was at the height of his authority in the 1983-1988 period when he concurrently 
held the positions of commander in chief of the armed forces and minister of defense and 
security, while continuing to maintain his tight hold on the intelligence apparatus. Moer­
dani intervened extensively in promotions and transfers both within the military and out­
side of it (in the regional bureaucracy for example). He succeeded in building a powerful 
network of loyal officers throughout the military hierarchy and especially in the intelligence 
services. Moerdani had enjoyed a close personal relationship with Suharto dating back to 
the early 1960s (to which he owed his position). But by the late 1980s, the extent of his pow­
7 Richard Robison, "Indonesia: Tensions in State and Regime," in Southeast Asia in the 1990s: Authoritarianism, 
Democracy and Capitalism, ed. Richard Robison, Kevin Hewison, and Gary Rodan (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 
1993) p. 50.
8 Robison, "Organising the Transition," pp. 56-57.
9 See the "Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite" series in Indonesia on the implications of generational 
change, in particular, Indonesia 36 (October 1983) and 56 (October 1993).
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er (increasingly being used against his chief rival and fellow presidential favorite Sudhar- 
mono) seemed increasingly to represent a threat to the president himself. On February 27, 
1988, one month before the March MPR session, Moerdani was suddenly dismissed from his 
post as commander in chief. From then until 1993 he continued to wield considerable influ­
ence both as defense and security minister and through informal channels. However, it 
appears that over the past two years his personal influence and that of his network have 
been considerably reduced by promotions, transfers, and military restructuring.10
Tensions within the military have been most evident since early 1988, when Moerdani 
was dismissed as commander in chief and, one month later, Sudharmono was awarded the 
vice-presidency by the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR). Sudharmono was a Suharto 
protege and, as state secretary and general chairperson of Golkar, had in some measure at­
tempted to consolidate the independence and power of the bureaucracy (including Golkar's 
independence from, and even willingness to criticize, ABRI). He had also undercut the mili­
tary's financial power and independence by his authority to decide on major government 
contracts. Leading up to the MPR session military elements, purportedly from the Moerdani 
camp, launched a gossip campaign concerning his alleged "Communist" past and support­
ed an unprecedented vice-presidential challenge by Naro, chairperson of the PPP (Develop­
ment Unity Party). In the MPR session itself, a previously little-known officer, Brigadier 
General Ibrahim Saleh, interrupted the election, storming to the podium and stating his 
disagreement with Sudharmono's candidacy. When this challenge was defeated, the mili­
tary pushed to capture up to 70 percent of the regional representation to the 1988 Golkar 
congress where Sudharmono was replaced as general chairperson by General Wahono, who 
was widely viewed as more sympathetic to military interests.
In more recent years the focus of most open military discontent has been Research and 
Technology Minister B.J. Habibie, who has emerged as Suharto's new right-hand man and 
the most prominent civilian in government. Military unhappiness has been prompted not 
only by the transfer to his jurisdiction of previously ABRI-owned enterprises and his role in 
costly armaments and equipment purchases, but also by the increasingly large role he plays 
in economic policy making and the awarding of government contracts, by his apparent 
ambition for the presidency, and by the part he has played for Suharto in seeking an insti­
tutional support base in the Muslim community through the Muslim Intellectuals' Organi­
zation, ICMI.11
The period since 1992 has been marked by two phenomena. In the first place, military 
officers have attempted to secure strategic positions which would put the military in a com­
manding position to determine the shape of a post-Suharto order. The clearest example of 
this was the 1993 elevation of Armed Forces Commander Try Sutrisno to the vice-presi­
10 In certain respects the intra-regime tensions of the late 1980s and early 1990s thus represent a continuation of a 
long-standing pattern of competition between factions centered on rival military officers, with the Soemitro 
versus Ali Moertopo rivalry of the early 1970s as the classic case. Much of the apparent ''military discontent" of 
recent years can in fact be attributed to rearguard actions mounted by Moerdani and many of his supporters. 
However, unlike during the frictions of the 1970s, dissatisfaction within the active officer corps has been substan­
tially directed at the president and the palace group, rather than rival officers. And it has been apparent that 
many senior officers have felt that the institutional interests of the military have been threatened, due to the 
political and economic changes touched on above. Moerdani's entourage has, of course, attempted to play upon 
these concerns and act as army spokesperson with regard to them, but discontent has clearly not been limited to 
this group alone.
On Habibie, see for example, William Liddle, "Politics 1992-1993: Sixth Term Adjustments in the Ruling 
Formula," in Indonesia Assessment 1993, ed. Manning and Hardjono (Canberra: Australian National University, 
1993), pp. 3-34; Harold Crouch, "Indonesia an Uncertain Outlook," Southeast Asian Affairs, 1994, p. 125.
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dency, a key position in the succession equation. This occurred by virtual fait accompli, with 
an unprecedented public announcement two weeks prior to the MPR that Try was the 
military's choice for the post. This manoeuver was engineered by Moerdani-associate Lieu­
tenant General Harsudiyono Hartas, head of the Armed Forces faction in parliament at the 
time. Later in the year, as in 1988, military officers successfully secured the bulk of local and 
regional Golkar branches in preparation for the national congress—although in the end no 
confrontation took place and Suharto's nominee, Harmoko, was elected as the new general 
chairperson.12
Second, since 1992 a range of measures have been taken which were designed to reassert 
Suharto's control over the Armed Forces. These have included the removal of Moerdani 
from the cabinet, the rapid removal of Edi Sudradjat as commander in chief (after he made 
clear that he favored a military general chair for Golkar), numerous promotions and trans­
fers in regional commands, and the reorganization of military intelligence (both widely 
interpreted as blows against the Moerdani network). As expected, Tien Suharto's brother-in- 
law, Wismoyo Arismunandar has continued his rapid progress through the ranks and now 
occupies the position of army chief of staff. At the same time ABRI commander Feisal 
Tanjung has begun to effect an apparent reconciliation with Habibie, suggested by the re­
placement of Hariyoto by Hartono as the chief of staff for social and political affairs.
The apparent ease with which the above changes have been carried out clearly indicates 
that the divisions in the military should not be exaggerated. Political alignments in the 
Armed Forces have been both fluid and difficult to measure accurately. Anti-Suharto senti­
ment is clearly far from uniform, and may not even be dominant. Not only is the military 
permeated by Suharto loyalists, but ABRI's deeply ingrained doctrine of loyalty and disci­
pline and a reluctance to provoke social unrest militate against action by those who are 
dissatisfied. Most officers remain sitting on the fence and even those (including from the 
Moerdani group) who have been most opposed to Sudharmono, Habibie, and the palace 
have been very hesitant and cautious. This is further compounded by Suharto's advanced 
age and the inevitability of his not-too-distant departure from the presidency. Discontented 
elements in the military have thus far avoided open confrontation, perhaps hoping to post­
pone it until the post-Suharto period, while in the meantime attempting to strengthen their 
position (though not necessarily always succeeding in doing so).
Military Discontent and Liberalization
From the late 1980s until mid-1994, largely coinciding with growing restlessness in the 
military, Indonesia experienced a (limited and uneven) loosening of political controls. There 
was increasingly open public debate on a range of policy matters, the press became remark­
ably critical, public protest became an everyday occurrence, and many critical and dissent­
ing groups attained previously unthinkable public exposure. This was a complex process, 
and a wide range of factors contributed to it, including the social changes brought about by 
economic development, the changing international context, and imperatives for a more 
regularized framework for continued capitalist accumulation. This article does not seek to 
enter the broad debate about what have been the determining factors underlying keterbu- 
kaan. Rather it looks at the interface between military discontent and the activities of
12 Similarly, military elements (although here evidence is far from complete) played a role in the eventual con­
firmation of Megawati Soekarnoputri as leader of the PDI in late 1993. In particular, it appears that the military 
(except for officers most loyal to Suharto) largely abstained from the campaign of sabotage directed against her 
nomination which was instead attempted by the social and political affairs section of the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs, controlled by Suharto loyalist, Yogie SM (which spectacularly failed).
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dissenting groups (students). For present purposes, then, it is important to note that a num­
ber of observers have argued that military discontent is a, or indeed, the key cause of open­
ness. For instance, Harold Crouch,13 referring to the situation leading up to the 1993 MPR 
session, argues:
The division between the government on one hand and the military leadership on the
other has been the crucial condition for the keterbukaan (openness) of the past few years..
. .  The military, as guardians of security, have adopted a liberal stance not because they
are committed to democratic ideals but in order to put pressure on the government.
Similarly, in a number of recent articles and papers, Arief Budiman has argued that open­
ness and the rise of an "under current" (arus baxoah) of popular involvement in politics has 
been dependent on conflict at the regime level.14 It is also a significant theme in the 1993 
book by Far Eastern Economic Review journalist Michael Vatikiotis.15
If we assume that fractures in the regime associated with discontent in some important 
military circles are indeed a key cause of liberalization, an obvious question arises: just how 
has this come about? Through what mechanisms has regime-level friction given rise to 
loosening up? In particular, what has been the relationship between military discontent and 
the increase in activity by dissenting and oppositional groupings in recent years?
Many possible mechanisms suggest themselves; here it is necessary to touch on just a 
few. First, there is a relatively straightforward role of "leading by example." The ABRI frac­
tion in the 1988-1992 Parliament (DPR) played an important role in the initiation and pro­
motion of the keterbukaan process. In 1989, via the Political and Social Affairs Commission, it 
held a series of sessions on openness. This initiative was enthusiastically taken up by the 
media, and made an important contribution to the legitimation of questioning and criti­
cism.16 Again, Moerdani associate Harsudiyono Hartas was a key player in this process.
Second, it is often argued that the military has played a more indirect role, by loosening 
political controls and giving rein to civilian forces. Examples frequently cited include the 
military's apparently more lenient approach to protest, or its partial abstention from the 
campaign against Megawati's election to the leadership of the Indonesian Democracy Party 
(PDI).
Third, more than this, it is sometimes implied that military elements actively "encour­
age" challenges to the state, or that they have provided "backing" to critical groups, al­
though it is often not made clear exactly what such "encouragement" consists of. For 
example, Vatikiotis, discussing military unhappiness with Sudharmono and the succession 
issue, writes:17
13 Crouch, "Democratic Prospects in Indonesia," p. 121.
14 Arief Budiman: 'Indonesian Politics in the 1990s," in Indonesia Assessment 1992: Political Perspectives on the 
1990s, ed. Harold Crouch and Hal Hill (Canberra: Australian National University, 1992), pp. 130-39.; "From 
Lower to Middle Class: Political Activities before and after 1988," in Democracy in Indonesia, ed. Bourchier and 
Legge, pp. 229-35.; "People Power: Proses Yang Sedang Berjalan," Editor, January 7,1994, pp. 28-29. A similar 
argument is made by Ichlasul Amal in an interview headlined Gerakan Mahasiswa Manifestasi Persaingan 
Antarelite Politik (The student movement is a manifestation of competition within the political elite) in Suara 
Merdeka, December 7,1991.
15 Indonesian Politics Under Suharto (London: Routledge, 1993).
16 Lane, 'Openness,' Political Discontent and Succession in Indonesia, pp. 15-16.
17 Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics Under Suharto, p. 162. At p. 5. Vatikiotis also writes of student protests which are 
"seemingly guided by the armed forces."
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Having failed to convince him of their wishes, Abri turned to the manipulation of social 
forces: a succession of strategies which drew on Abri's experience countering Commu­
nism in the mid-1960s. Students were persuaded to demonstrate, political levers were 
pulled within Golkar, and threats to stability were concocted.
An emphasis on this kind of clandestine encouragement reflects the state and elite- 
centered emphasis of the "cultural politics" and "patrimonial state" approaches to analyz­
ing Indonesian politics, which have dominated much work by outside political scientists 
observing Indonesia since the late 1960s. These approaches lend themselves to tracing the 
causes of political conflict to the state elite, and especially (via patron-client pyramids) to 
factional disputes within that elite.18 In popular terms, this is often translated as the search 
for a political dalang (the puppeteer in Javanese wayang) responsible for the manipulation 
and "playing off' of less powerful groups.19
Fourth, one of the central themes of this article is that the mere existence of intra-regime 
friction, or at least a perception that such friction exists, encourages a "snowballing" of the 
mobilization and organization of dissenting and critical forces. Civilian groupings make a 
reading of politics at the regime level, analyze opportunities and spaces afforded them by 
such conflict, and attempt to make use of them. Thus, friction has promoted a vigorous and 
multi-faceted strategic debate among civilian groups which have long been excluded from 
power.
Finally, a perception on the part of the "Suharto camp" that there is significant military 
dissatisfaction has also played a role. According to a number of informants from elite Jakar­
ta political circles, in recent years the president and senior officials around him have become 
increasingly convinced that a layer of dissatisfied army officers has been consolidating into 
an cohesive group, and that this group has been actively searching for allies and success­
fully building conspiratorial links with civilian politicians and activists. Such suspicions 
have been partially responsible for the palace group's own search for a new political consti­
tuency—especially amongst Islamic groups via ICMI. Along the way, further concessions 
have been made. The investigations into the massacres in Dili (East Timor) and Nipah 
(Madura), as well as the establishment of the National Human Rights Commission, were 
initiatives of the palace, and it has been the military which has borne the immediate brunt of 
them (in the case of the inquiry into the Dili massacre, a chief casualty was Moerdani man 
Panjaitan).20 It should thus be noted that disgruntled military elements have by no means 
been the only source within the regime of concessions (albeit token ones) in the direction of 
liberalization.
Much of the remainder of this article looks at the second, third, and fourth processes 
mentioned above in terms of relations between military elements and student activists.
18 See for example, Karl Jackson, "Bureaucratic Polity: A Theoretical Framework for the Analysis of Power and 
Communications in Indonesia," in Political Power and Communications in Indonesia, ed. K. Jackson and L. Pye 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978) p. 4.: "Whenever mass mobilization has occurred in Indonesia the 
initiative has always come from within the elite." Similarly, in a paper written early in the New Order period, 
Ann R. Willner argued that public protests in Indonesia " . . .  tend to be provoked and planned from the top or 
close to it by one or several members of the political elite" who make use of their patron-client pyramids to 
mobilize their followers: Public Protest in Indonesia, (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Center for International 
Studies, 1968), pp. 7-8.
19 The search for the dalang is, of course, also a part of the standard response of the regime to social or political 
unrest—most famously after Malari, where senior former politicians from the PSI (Indonesian Socialist Party) 
and Masjumi were scapegoated.
20 "Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite," Indonesia 53 (April 1992): 100-101.
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Before proceeding, it is worth touching on two of the possible explanations which might 
account for the apparent promotion or tolerance of keterbukaan by military elements (to the 
extent that such tolerance has been conscious or intended).
First, it cannot be excluded that support for a new approach from sections of the military 
partly reflects the existence of a younger, more reformist and professional layer of officers 
within ABRI who recognize that changes in Indonesia's social structure and the global situa­
tion mean that the military's social and political role cannot remain unchanged, and hence 
contemplate some reduction or reformulation of the military role and some level of democ­
ratization. The vigorous proponents of keterbukaan in the ABRI/DPR fraction during the 
1987-1992 period were younger middle-ranking officers, who were in fact reprimanded by 
Try Sutrisno at that time. Brigadier Roekmini Koesoemo Astoeti, for example, since her 
removal from the DPR has continued to be an active proponent of reform, openness, and 
democratization on the Jakarta seminar circuit, and, more recently, as a member of the 
National Human Rights Commission.
However, there is no evidence to point to the emergence of a vigorous military reform 
current committed to some kind of civilianized, more democratic, and liberal system. For 
every tentative step in favor of loosening up, there have been many pronouncements in the 
old vein, and ABRI has continued to emphasize the centrality of security and stability, as 
attested to by the number of massacres of protesting civilians in recent years. According to 
several civilian sources interviewed in Jakarta in 1993-1994, indications are that those in 
ABRI who contemplate change envisage at most a somewhat cleaner and more efficient 
authoritarian government, with less flagrant corruption, and possibly with a greater watch­
dog role for the legislature. There have been no unequivocal indications from serving offi­
cers of support for more thorough reform. What we have witnessed, then, has not been a 
split between regime "soft-liners" in the military and "hard-liners" in the Suharto camp— 
instead both sides are fundamentally authoritarian (although both may contain minority 
reformist elements).
The second explanation for military "encouragement," or toleration, of a thaw, is that it 
reflects a search by the military (or sections within it) for an expanded political base. In 
crude terms the new tolerance entails tactical concessions designed to cleanse the military's 
image and win over potential civilian allies. A major consideration would be the anticipa­
tion of possible forthcoming political struggles, most strategically for the presidency. At the 
same time, military elements selectively tolerate criticism of their competitors and oppo­
nents in the regime, allowing dissident proxies to weaken and undercut their legitimacy. 
This, to say the least, is a game which may be difficult or impossible to control.
The Tradition of Dissent.
Despite the authoritarian character of the New Order regime, a tradition of urban elite 
and middle class dissent has continued to exist in Indonesia. Today there exist a wide range 
of critical Non-Government Organizations (NGOs), human rights bodies, student groups, 
critical journalists, and quasi-opposition elite groupings like the Petition of Fifty and Forum 
Demokrasi.
In practical terms, the bulk of the public activity of most such regime critics today is 
essentially oriented to policy reform. These kinds of groups generate an endless stream of 
criticism of regime policy on matters such as human rights, development, and labor issues. 
They also focus on corruption and other barriers to rational and efficient administration. In 
effect, their work constitutes a continual battle for the reorientation of state policy over
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particular policies and for the rationalization of state administration. To some extent, this 
approach reflects a measured and explicit reforming, gradualist outlook on the part of many 
such regime critics. More importantly, it also results from the marginal and subordinated 
position of dissenting groups and their inability to organize openly and orient to the ques­
tion of political power.21
The recent friction in the regime has opened up space for the pursuit of such activities, 
but it has also prompted debates about strategy for longer term regime change and democ­
ratization. There have been long-running debates about the appropriate orientation for 
civilian groups, given the clear depth of regime disunity and expectations of presidential 
succession.22 These debates have been wide ranging, although most accept and argue the 
need to take advantage of the current space to organize and strengthen the bargaining 
power of "civil society." Some, particularly younger and more radical activists, eschew any 
talk of conciliation with any elements in the regime. Beyond this is a basic division on 
whether the Suharto camp or the military are the key obstacle to democratic reform. On the 
one hand are those who emphasize Suharto's personal role in the development of the 
authoritarian system and consider that ultimately, given its military power, ABRI is certain 
to play a determinative role in any regime transition, and there is thus a need for civilian 
democratizers to orient to the military in some way (although there may be differences over 
just what such an orientation should consist of). On the other hand are those who view the 
military as the major institutional obstacle to democratization, and thus consider it more 
advantageous to make a tactical alliance with the Suharto and Habibie camp. This is the 
position especially of those Islamic intellectuals and activists who have joined ICMI, which 
NGO leaders like Dawam Rahardjo and Adi Sasono have argued can be viewed as an 
important means to promote the "civilianization" of government.
Student Activism
Student activists are a good entry point into some of these debates, not only because 
debates among student activists are rather more transparent than those in the elite opposi­
tion milieu, but also because of the place of students in New Order mythology. The 1966 
student movement provided a display of apparent mass support for the overthrow of 
Sukarno, and thus gave the new regime crucial legitimation. This historic example of stu­
dent-military "partnership" has been made much of in New Order discourse, and is lost on 
no one today.
The legacy of this collaboration was to color succeeding generations of student protest in 
the late 1960s and 1970s. Especially in the early 1970s student protesters were reluctant to 
condemn the regime in blanket terms. Rather, the emphasis was on regularization and re­
form on issues like corruption, development policy, and extra-constitutional institutions, 
especially Kopkamtib (the Command for the Restoration of Security and Order). At the 
same time, however, disillusionment increased with Suharto and what was seen as the circle 
of corrupt generals surrounding him. Elements in the movement preceding the Malari 
incident of January 1974 were motivated partially by the (misplaced) calculation that
21 Many regime critics, especially those in NGOs, have argued that their activity contributes to long-term pro­
cesses of social and political change, which (at least for the present) avoids the question of regime change. 
Instead, many use terms such as "policy advocacy," "building a counter-hegemony," or "strengthening civil 
society" to describe their approach. This has enabled them generally to avoid repression and carve out a 
relatively secure, if marginal, position for themselves in the political system.
22 Indeed, many critics interviewed in 1993-1994 used the phrase Rqmblik hamil tua (the Republic is in the 
advanced stage of pregnancy), with deliberate irony echoing descriptions used by the PKI in 1965.
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Kopkamtib commander Soemitro was preparing to seize power from Suharto, would be 
willing to do so if given the opportunity, or at least could be pushed in that direction in the 
same way that students forced the pace of change in 1966. Following this misreading of 
Soemitro's intentions, many student leaders were arrested and political activity on cam­
puses was circumscribed.
The reemergence of student protest in 1977-1978 was marked by a hardening of atti­
tudes toward the regime, reflected in the call for Suharto not to stand for re-election. In 
public, attitudes to the military remained conciliatory, with a common theme at many 
demonstrations a call for "ABRI to return to the people." At the same time, an undercurrent 
of anti-military sentiment had been evolving since the early 1970s. This emerged most clear­
ly during the trials of student leaders which were held following the crackdown which took 
place in early 1978 . The defense speech of ITB student Indro Tjahjono, entitled Indonesia di 
bawah sepatu lars (Indonesia under the jackboot), was the most explicit student indictment of 
the military role in politics up to that time.
The crackdown following the 1977-1978 student movement was more comprehensive 
and effective than any preceding measures. Student councils were frozen and a permanent 
ban was placed on political activities on campus. Campus bureaucracies were given greatly 
extended rights to intervene in student activities. Collectively, these policies were known as 
NKK/BKK (Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus / Badan Koordinasi Kemahasiswaan, Normalization 
of Campus Life / Body for the Coordination of Student Affairs).
The effect of NKK/BKK was further to marginalize student activism from the main­
stream of Indonesian political life. During the 1980s it was virtually impossible for students 
critical of the government to organize openly on campus. Some became active in poor com­
munities, working for those NGOs which were beginning to question some of the para­
digms which had hitherto dominated developmental thinking. Others were involved in 
study groups which from the early 1980s began to mushroom around major campuses. 
Although such groups varied greatly in political outlook, most led a semi-underground 
existence, limiting their outside contacts to similar groups, a few critical intellectuals, and 
NGOs. In these kinds of groups students reevaluated previous generations of activism, 
searched for new strategies, and studied a broad range of critical theories, including depen­
dency theory, the writings of the Frankfurt School, Latin American liberation theology, as 
well as classical Marxism.
The reemergence of a new and protracted wave of organized student protest was 
marked by an outbreak of protests against NKK/BKK and in favor of "campus autonomy" 
in Yogyakarta, Bandung, and Jakarta in the latter months of 1988.23 From early 1989 until 
the present, public demonstrations by student activists have been a commonplace, almost 
daily, occurrence in the main university towns of Java. A very broad range of issues, mostly 
with a human rights dimension, have been raised. The most common issues have included 
restrictions on the right to organize on campus, arrests or trials of student activists, 
irregularities in land disputes, and so on. Some campaigns have been particularly intense, 
such as those concerning major land disputes like that at the site of the Kedung Ombo 
reservoir in Central Java in 1989-1990, various trials of student activists in Yogyakarta,
23 See for example, Tempo, November 12,1988, p. 33; December 3,1988, pp. 34-35; December 24,1988, p. 80.
Students and the Military 31
Bandung, and Jakarta since 1989, or the banning of the news magazines Detik, Tempo, and 
Editor in mid-1994.24
The student protest movement which has emerged since the late 1980s has in several 
ways been quite different from those of the 1960s and 1970s. In the first place, its regional 
distribution has been distinctive. Both the 1966 generation and the 1973-1974 and 1977-1978 
outbreaks were strongly Jakarta and Bandung centered. Although these cities have re­
mained important, the new wave of activism has been much more widely and evenly 
dispersed, and in the years since 1989 sustained organizing has emerged in most of the 
important university towns of Java: Jakarta, Bandung, Bogor, Semarang, Yogyakarta, Solo, 
Salatiga, Surabaya, Malang, Jombang, and Jember. Student groups with links to those in 
Java also exist in Bali and Lombok, and have recently emerged in Medan and Menado. If 
anything, Central Java, and especially Yogyakarta, has been something of a focus, especially 
in the early period of 1989-1990 when Forum Komunikasi Mahasiswa Yogyakarta (FKMY, 
the Communication Forum of Yogyakarta Students) provided a model.25
Second, unlike in the 1960s and 1970s when students from the elite state universities 
(especially Universitas Indonesia, UI and Institut Teknologi Bandung, ITB) were the un­
challenged pacesetters of the movement, new groups have involved many more students 
from smaller and less prestigious private campuses. In Jakarta in particular, at least until 
recently, UI has been conspicuously quiescent and students from private campuses there 
such as Universitas Nasional, Universitas Mustopo, Universitas 17 Agustus, and many 
others have played a more prominent role. In part this change reflects the fact that 
NKK/BKK was more rigorously applied to state universities, especially those which had 
been foci of political activism. But it also reflects the changing shape of tertiary education. 
Economic development has created demands for new skills and higher educational levels 
and has greatly expanded the market for tertiary education by producing a larger middle 
class with aspirations for upward mobility. As a result, the number of private tertiary 
institutions has mushroomed. According to figures released by the Ministry of Education 
and Culture, the number of private universities increased from 63 in 1978 to 221 in 1990, 
with much of the increase occurring in provincial centers (in Yogyakarta during the same 
period the number rose from five to eleven).26 Tertiary education is no longer the exclusive 
preserve of the upper reaches of the narrow, cosmopolitan elite of the big cities (many of 
whom, in any case, send their children overseas for study) as it arguably was in the 1960s 
and even the 1970s. Instead, it has become more accessible to wider layers, including youths
24 For a discussion of the issues raised in student protests in 1987-1990, see E. Aspinall, Student Dissent in 
Indonesia in the 1980s (Clayton, Vic.: Monash University Centre of Southeast Asian Studies Working Paper 79, 
1993), pp. 17-21.
25 Although there are dangers in such generalizations, groups in the different towns and regions have tended to 
have distinct characteristics. Broadly speaking, Central Java and Yogyakarta have been the center of the new 
radicalism in the student movement. In Jakarta and Bandung, where students tend to have more elite back­
grounds and where activists are more closely integrated with elite opposition circles, groups have tended to 
maintain more the traditions of the past. This has been especially the case at ITB where the legacy of the (some 
would say PSI-inclined) "Independent Group" of the 1970s has remained important. Activist groups in Jombang 
and Jember have been heavily influenced by the strong NU presence in these towns. But in more recent years, as 
inter-city networking has expanded, regional distinctions have tended to break down.
26 Daftardan Status Perguruan Tinggi Swastadi Indonesia Tahun 1978 (Jakarta: Direktorat Jenderal Pendidikan 
Tinggi, 1979); Statistik Perguruan Tinggi Swasta Tahun 1990/1991 (Jakarta: Badan Penelitian dan Pengembangan 
Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, Pusat Informatika, 1993).
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from lower middle class backgrounds (whether military, civil service, entrepreneurial, or 
professional) in the provincial centers.27
A third difference is organizational form. In the 1970s the student protest movement 
was largely organized by the legal and officially recognized elected student councils 
(Dewan Mahasiswa). This avenue was largely shut off by NKK/BKK. In the late 1980s and 
early 1990s the public face of student protest was largely represented by transient and ad hoc 
action committees, which would coalesce for a particular campaign and then disband. For 
example, Kelompok Solidaritas Korban Pembangunan Waduk Kedung Ombo (Group in 
solidarity with the sacrificial victims of the Kedung Ombo reservoir development) at its 
height in 1989 involved students from a number of cities, but was soon abandoned as the 
campaign declined. Such action committees would be alliances of less publicly visible 
groups based on particular campuses, which have remained the organizational bedrock of 
the movement. Often such campus-based groups are formed around the nucleus of a 
discussion group or a campus magazine or newspaper, and operate as organizing and 
recruiting centers. These first began to emerge in the mid to late 1980s, when networking 
between cities also began. Open city-wide organizations which endeavored to coordinate 
formally the activities of the campus-based groups began to appear in the late 1980s. The 
prototype was the Communication Forum in Yogyakarta (FKMY) which in 1989 claimed a 
membership of 1,500 students from some twenty different campuses.28 Around the same 
time (1989-1990) similar organizations were established in other cities, the most prominent 
of which were BKMJ (Badan Koordinasi Mahasiswa Jakarta), Bakor (Badan Koordinasi 
Mahasiswa Bandung), and FKMS (Forum Komunikasi Mahasiswa Surabaya). Since then, 
although some of these groups, including FKMY, have declined and been replaced by new 
and sometimes competing city-wide organizations, there have been various attempts to 
organize more openly on an inter-city basis, with the formation, for example, of the loose 
coalition FAMI (Front Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia, Indonesian Students Action Front), 
twenty-one of whose members were put on trial in early 1994, and SMID (Solidaritas 
Mahasiswa Indonesia untuk Demokrasi, Student Solidarity for Democracy in Indonesia) 
which is more tightly organized and was launched publicly at a congress in August 1994 29
The most striking difference between the student groups which emerged in the late 
1980s and the movement of the 1970s, however, was in political outlook. The more recent 
groups were dominated by a new and distinct radical-populist mood. Student activists 
"lived in" at villages targeted for development projects and organized political training and 
defense campaigns involving the affected communities, an altogether new phenomenon 
under the New Order.30 Their pamphlets, defense speeches, and essays stressed that they 
were interested in the basic empowerment of the poor, and often adopted a markedly more 
confrontational and radical tone than in the 1970s. Much of this literature stressed that, 
where the movement of the 1970s had taken up "elite" issues and attempted to intervene in 
national politics, the new movement was more concerned with struggling for the rights and 
interests of the common people—the ratyat. Indeed, the discourse of the movement was 
marked by a general tone of hostility to "elite politics," in large part based on the
27 Student activists, including many of the most radical, are from a broad range of middle class and elite back- 
grounds. Strikingly, but unsurprisingly, many are the children of middle and low ranking ABRI officers.
28 Tempo, April 24,1989, p. 30.
29 Jakarta Post, August 4,1994.
30 For a discussion of some of the issues involved in such "land cases," see Anton Lucas, "Land Disputes in 
Indonesia: Some Current Perspectives," Indonesia 53 (April 1992): 79-92.
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understanding that the student movement of the 1970s had been ditunggangi (used, taken 
advantage of) by elite interests. Attitudes to the military in the new student movement were 
also generally more hostile than in the preceding generations.31
The new mood of populist radicalism in the student movement broadly reflected the 
marginalized position of student activism in the 1980s, whereby activists had ended up off 
campus, working with NGOs and searching for more thoroughgoing solutions for political 
and social problems. More particularly, it also resulted from the influence of the radical and 
structural theories which had been studied during the study group phase. Certainly a num­
ber of activists had been particularly influenced by this material and consciously strove to 
impart a more militant tone to the movement.
Although there was a core of more consistently radical activists, the New Order's de­
politicization and "de-ideologization" of campuses (and society more broadly) also tended 
to obscure the contours of political debate in the new activist circles. Students critical of the 
government had been unable to participate in public political activity and had been little 
exposed to the open competition of differing political ideas. In contrast to the earlier period, 
under the New Order distinct ideological currents had been unable to emerge and compete 
on campuses. And indeed, the new activist groups would often contain members with 
widely varying family political backgrounds, with students with Sukamoist, Islamic, or 
Christian heritages sometimes coexisting within the same group.32 All of this has contrib­
uted to the somewhat vague and essentially moral character of much of the populist student 
critique. Many student activists who have been active for many years say they are unable or 
unwilling to define their political outlook or aims, beyond a broad visi kerakyatan (populist 
vision) which entails a general defense of the poor and their political, economic, and social 
interests. Many activists argue that their actions are not motivated by ideological considera­
tions or developed political aims, but that they are simply responding to visible injustices in 
Indonesian society. There is thus a strong strand in the student movement which continues 
the "moral force"—and hence essentially regularizing and reformist—traditions of the 
1970s, albeit with a more populist tone. Indeed, some activists argue explicitly that the stu­
dent movement is a moral rather than a political movement, and others view it in classic 
regularizing terms as a "social control."
Even from the earliest days of their emergence in the 1980s, then, there were incipient 
tensions in the new activist circles. Although many activists argued in essentially moral and 
regularizing terms, others identified strongly with more radical theories and were strongly 
influenced by radical student movements in South Korea and the Philippines.
Indeed, the movement has been marked by often bitter conflict, mutual recriminations, 
and suspicion. Often these do not have a basis in political differences, but stem from per­
sonal enmities, competition or tension between groups and regions, squabbles over funding, 
and so on. Some conflicts, however, have been caused by differences in political outlook. As 
the student movement has emerged from a virtually clandestine to a more open existence,
31 See Aspinall, Student Dissent in Indonesia in the 1980s, pp. 22-44 for a discussion of the themes of the new 
movement.
32 For example, students from the families of former Socialist Party (PSI) members or members of the Nahdatul 
Ulama Party or Islamic Students Association (HMI). The extent to which differing political currents have been 
blurred together in these groups is indicated by the fact that a number of groups (especially in Central Java) have 
attempted to reconcile Islam and Indonesia's radical heritage, by studying the experiences of the Sarekat Islam in 
the early 1920s and reviving the writings of Haji Misbach and other early "red santri."
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there have developed two increasingly visible poles. In part, this process has been reflected 
in splits in the major student activist groups, especially in Central Java.33
On the one hand, there is a more consistently "populist" pole which maintains a vision 
of popular transformation, and continues to emphasize "mass" work—the organization of 
farmers, and (especially in the last two to three years) urban workers, and continues to 
eschew "elite politics." These students tend to be influenced by radical, structural analyses. 
This current more or less approximates, for example, the above-ground groups SMID and 
PRD (Persatuan Rakyat Demokratik, Democratic Peoples' Alliance).34
On the other hand, there is what is perhaps best defined as a "moral politics" pole which 
is closer to the mainstream tradition of student dissent in the early New Order. In addition 
to continuing campaigns on farmer and worker issues, over the last two or three years these 
students have increasingly raised what are sometimes referred to by student activists as 
"elite" issues concerning corruption and leadership in national politics. (This is highlighted 
by a series of protests directed against Suharto in 1993 which were strikingly similar to 
those of 1977-1978). These students tend to stress their moral motivations and the moral 
character of their struggle, the need for boldness and risk, and often see their role as being in 
large part as a pressure group able to raise sensitive issues to the political agenda. They tend 
to engage less than the populist groups in directly organizing farmers or workers; instead 
their typical modus operandi is often relatively small demonstrations which involve consid­
erable risk.35 Many groups can be roughly identified with this current, including the promi­
nent Jakarta organization Yayasan Pijar and the Students Action Front FAMI.
From the preceding discussion it is to be hoped that a rough picture has emerged of the 
kind of student groups with which this article is concerned. These are not the large and 
government recognized cross-campus organizations like HMI (Himpunan Mahasiswa 
Islam, the Islamic Students' Association) nor those groups which have mobilized around 
primarily religious issues. Rather, the focus is on those generally small groups, mostly in 
Java, which have been behind the spate of demonstrations in recent years on "human 
rights," "populist," and "democratic" issues.
Student-Military Interaction: Clandestine Encouragement?
The most elementary point to make about the relationship between the military and 
student activists during the openness period is that it remains dominated by repression. 
Over forty student activists have been tried on various political or criminal charges since
33 It must be stressed that this polarization is at an early stage, and the two poles are often difficult to distinguish 
in the activist milieu, consisting as it does of a huge number of small and transient groups, which often share a 
similar language and insist that they all share the same basic visi kerakyatan.
34 PRD aims at being an umbrella organization for various social sectors, but it draws heavily on students 
recruited in the 1980s and 1990s. On the launch of PRD, see reports in: Editor, May 5,1994; Tempo, May 14,1994; 
Kompas, May 4,1994. The declaration issued by PRD on its formation calls for, inter alia, the "return to civilian 
supremacy," the "review of Dwifungsi and the security approach," removal of restrictions on the formation and 
operation of political parties, and the "return of the civil rights of ex-political prisoners."
35 For example, many in Jakarta opposition circles criticized as "premature" a December 14,1993, demonstration 
at the DPR building where some 200 students called for an extraordinary MPR session to hold Suharto account­
able for a number of human rights violations. The response from one participant, when I put this to him, was "If 
students do not criticize Suharto, who will? If we do not do it now, when will we?" He was uninterested in long­
er term questions of political strategy and tactics, which he saw as an excuse for inaction on the part of "elite" 
critics, and said that students should be proud that they were once again in the vanguard, the first group to be 
bold enough to articulate openly the desires of a large segment of society.
Students and the Military 35
1988. Demonstrations are frequently broken up violently, and student activists—especially 
participants in land-dispute campaigns—have been tortured. Beyond this, activists are con­
fronted by constant low-level monitoring, intimidation, and harassment. There is invariably 
a large security presence at demonstrations; intelligence officers frequently "drop in" at 
meeting places, and activists are frequently picked up "to chat" or for interrogation. Even at 
the campus level, there is often a state of virtually constant confrontation—often violent— 
with the campus Menwa (Student Regiment) which is under the direct supervision of the 
local military command.
Beyond this there are, of course, many other kinds of contact between student activists 
and officials, military and otherwise. For example, demonstrations frequently end in dia­
logue with government officials, who are often military officers. For present purposes, 
however, we are particularly interested in more informal, private approaches to student 
groups, and to what extent these have been viewed as "encouragement" by students. Cer­
tainly, since the reemergence of student protest in the late 1980s, many such approaches 
have been made.
One of the first examples occurred at an early stage of campaigning on land-dispute 
issues (early 1989), when a prominent military officer, initially disguised as a journalist, 
visited student activists in Central Java. This officer was considered by the activists I spoke 
to as "Benny's right-hand man." He asked many questions about the movement and the 
students' aims and concluded by telling them to contact him: "If you need anything, if you 
wish to criticize Suharto, if you need funds, if you need posters or anything like that." He 
also offered to put them in contact with the ABRI faction in the DPR. On leaving, he handed 
the students an envelope containing a large amount of money. This incident occurred at the 
beginning of the reemergence of the student protest movement, when the new emphasis on 
defending the poor and spuming involvement in elite conflict was very fresh. The students 
were somewhat perplexed by this approach, rejected the money, and did not follow up any 
of his offers.
A more regular pattern of contacts began in late 1989, involving some Jakarta student 
activists involved in campaigning regarding land disputes and similar issues. For some 
time, frequent informal contacts and dialogues took place between some students and local 
intelligence officers. Sometimes these were initiated by students, but more frequently by the 
military (often using threats and intimidation in the process). The officers would seek infor­
mation about the students' activities and motivations, which would often lead on to more 
general discussions. For their part, students would use these opportunities to seek informa­
tion concerning the "political constellation at the elite level," especially the "Benny split" 
and "the riches of Suharto and his family"—although on these particular occasions the 
military never openly criticized the president. However, they were more open concerning 
conflicts between ministers or scandals involving high-ranking regime officials (for example 
concerning Minister Sudomo's personal life). According to my informants, neither the 
military nor the students would openly discuss their own political views or plans: one 
activist suggested that each side was trying to make use of and manipulate the other.
In these discussions, the military officers would indicate sympathy with the students 
and their aims, approving their concern for the poor. A number of students suggested to me 
that these intelligence officers "encouraged" (mendorong) them to continue holding protests. 
At the same time, the officers would stress their concerns about stability and warn students 
against infiltration by the "extreme left." A number of informants also suggested to me that 
on a number of occasions money was offered to the students for their campaigning work, 
and on at least some of those occasions it was accepted.
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Intensive contact continued to take place between these activists and the military from 
late 1989 until 1992. It largely ceased following strong criticism of it by students from Cen­
tral Java. Since 1992, the student movement in Jakarta has become more complex and splin­
tered, but a number of activists continue to maintain informal contacts with the officers they 
got to know during the earlier period.
A number of informants in towns in East and Central Java told me that similar 
approaches from the military have occurred from time to time in those regions (although 
activists there tend to be more averse to such contacts than many of those in Jakarta), and 
were particularly intense through 1993 and early 1994. A frequent pattern was for military 
intelligence officers to call in at the boarding houses which serve as meeting places, and 
invite activists for dinner (or even sometimes to the movies). Again, in informal discussions 
on these occasions, the officers were mainly concerned with discussing the students' activi­
ties and criticisms, and would often profess sympathy for their motivations. More than this, 
officers would sometimes specifically indicate that they were disillusioned with President 
Suharto, with the corruption and business dealings of his family, and with their collusion 
with Chinese business interests. Sometimes they would go even further: in one case a BAIS 
(military intelligence) officer (in the recollection of one activist) told a student: "We share 
the same vision, we've both been disappointed and we should work together to overthrow 
Suharto."
It is impossible to gauge the full extent, implications, or meaning of these kinds of ap­
proaches. For example, it is striking that the most senior of the officers involved tended to 
be closely identified with Benny Moerdani. The more junior officers were, unsurprisingly, 
invariably from the intelligence services. In any case, it may seem tempting to conclude that 
what is involved is an attempt by military elements to manipulate and encourage student 
dissent and to position themselves for some kind of rerun of the 1966 "student-military 
coalition." In a general sense, it is clear that the officers involved have been attempting to 
forge close personal relations with a layer of activists, to win their sympathy, and build a 
level of trust. But this could serve any number of objectives, including simple intelligence 
gathering and, indisputably, the search for reliable agents. In a more long-term sense, how­
ever, the relationships and networks established by such informal contacts would constitute 
useful resources for possible future needs, including potential factional struggles.
When we turn to the larger question of the relationship between intra-regime tension 
and the emergence of protest, it is very difficult to sustain an argument that such contacts 
significantly "encouraged" student dissent and protest. It is not possible to assign military 
elements the role of dalang in this case. In the first place, such contacts were by no means 
uniform across all prominent activist groups, with many groups (especially the most radi­
cal, who are most often subject to violence) only rarely, if ever, approached. Furthermore, 
military officers invariably approached students after they had drawn attention to them­
selves by their activities, so the influence of such contacts can hardly be seen as a crucial 
factor in the emergence of protest. On the other hand, however, such contacts certainly did 
give students pause, and in a few cases, according to my informants, imparted a certain 
sense of confidence, a sense that they were being protected. Some (though seemingly a 
minority) became more sympathetic to the military as a result. More, however, told me that 
such approaches made them feel nervous and suspect that they were being manipulated by 
elite interests. At the very least, such contacts were consistently interpreted as further 
evidence of elite level conflict, which we will return to later in this article.
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Demonstrations and Political Space.
In the early 1980s, even relatively minor displays of defiance on campus were quickly 
repressed.36 Between late 1988 and mid-1994, despite many vacillations and often violent 
retreats, the regime, and more particularly the military, has adopted a relatively tolerant 
approach to student demonstrations. Although many demonstrations were still broken up 
violently, others were allowed to proceed more or less unhindered. Does this mean that 
discontented military elements have acted to "encourage" civilian dissent simply by 
adopting a soft approach to it?
Of course, at a general level it is impossible to separate intra-regime tension from all the 
other variables that have encouraged liberalization in this matter (which is, after all, at the 
very heart of the openness process). This kind of argument also tends to underplay the role 
dissenting groups themselves have played in pushing out the bounds of available political 
space during the keterbukaan period, often at considerable risk to themselves. Student acti­
vists have repeatedly confronted state repression over recent years, and in doing so have 
transformed public protest and demonstrations from a taboo to a day-to-day occurrence. 
However, there are a few particular cases where military leniency deserves comment, 
especially in demonstrations targeted against Suharto himself.
After the repression which followed student condemnation of President Suharto in early 
1978, the person of the president was largely considered a taboo topic by student activists. 
However, in early 1993, prior to and coinciding with the General Session of the MPR, a 
series of anti-Suharto demonstrations took place. The first occurred at a January PDI leader­
ship council meeting at Kopo, Bogor, where students, going under the banner of Aliansi 
Demokrasi Rakyat (Peoples' Democracy Alliance) called for the PDI (Indonesian Democracy 
Party) to make good its promises from the 1992 general election and nominate an alternative 
presidential candidate.37 To my knowledge, this was the first demonstration since the late 
1970s which was explicitly and exclusively directed against Suharto, and although the mili­
tary used standard brutality against the protesters, it was a surprise to many that none of 
those taken into custody were formally charged.
This was followed by a demonstration outside the parliament building during the gen­
eral session of the MPR on March 9,1993. A small number of student activists demonstrated 
their lack of faith in Suharto and called for him not to be reelected. Given the location and 
timing of the protest, this was an unprecedented open attack. And despite the presence of 
several hundred members of the security forces, it was allowed to go on for some time in 
full view of the national and international press. When security officers arrested five of the 
protesters, others were apparently ushered out of harm's way by military officers and told 
to get onto passing buses. Those arrested were held for just over twenty four hours.
Throughout 1993 student demonstrations on a range of issues—especially in Jakarta but 
also in other towns—became increasingly openly anti-Suharto, without inviting a military 
response. At a range of demonstrations, crude anti-Suharto slogans were shouted. On
36 For a description of the heavy-handed response to a number of student demonstrations which took place in 
Bandung between 1981 and 1986, see pp. 213-15. of the manuscript Indonesia: Kisah Tentang Sangkur dan Topi 
Baja—Merebut Kembali Hak Hak Rakyat, the defense speech of ITB student Ammarsyah in his 1990 trial.
37 See for example, Republika or Media Indonesia, January 12,1993.
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November 10, for the first time since Malari, a student demonstration (against the state 
lottery, SDSB) was allowed to proceed to the presidential palace.38
According to a number of students who were detained on such occasions, the line of 
questioning during interrogation would often be directed at ascertaining whether they were 
anti-military or merely opposed to the president. On at least one occasion students' insis­
tence that they were only anti-Suharto seemed to ensure their rapid release. In another case, 
a senior military officer, generally considered to be a Moerdani protege, attended an interro­
gation, and was very open and friendly with the detained students, inviting them to keep in 
communication with him and providing them with his private phone number.
The 1993 protests against the state lottery also excited much speculation regarding mili­
tary motives. During October and November a rash of very large demonstrations occurred 
in many towns in Java and other islands. Student participants to whom I spoke were uni­
versally surprised by the unusually soft-gloved approach of the military, to the extent that 
at some demonstrations students were given lifts aboard military trucks. It was commonly 
believed that this treatment was because members of the Suharto family were involved in 
the foundation running the lottery. These demonstrations were significant not only because 
of their scale and extent and the fact that they prompted a back down by the government, 
but also because they signify the increasing self-assuredness of Islamic groups in the chang­
ing political environment of recent years.
The demonstration at the DPR on December 14,1993, where twenty-one students were 
arrested (whose trials concluded in May 1994), is also of interest. For several hours the 
security personnel allowed some 100 students to protest in the DPR lobby. During this time 
the students attacked Suharto very forthrightly, holding up a banner reading Seret Presiden 
ke Sidang Istimewa MPR (Drag the President to an Extraordinary Session of the MPR) and 
openly shouting "Gatitung Suharto" (Hang Suharto) and similar slogans. However, the main 
focus of the demonstration was. in fact the "security approach," including a call for the dis­
solution of Bakorstanas (Badan Koordinasi Stabilitas Nasional, National Stability Coordinat­
ing Board, wihch had replaced Kopkamtib in 1988). According to a number of informants, it 
was only when the students began to abuse the military that they were almost immediately 
attacked. This led many in student and elite opposition circles to conclude that the pro­
38 Most of the students and youths who were mobilized in the SDSB protests were not from the land dispute/ 
social justice-oriented groups which are the focus of this article. Groups like FKM1J (The Jakarta Communication 
Forum of Islamic Students) and PMIB (The Bandung Alliance of Muslim Students), which played a large part in 
the organization of the 1993 wave of anti-SDSB demonstrations, were drawn mainly from hitherto largely cau­
tious Islamic student ormas and less formal networks of mosque and pesantren-based youth and students. They 
had previously mobilized on a mass scale only on issues where the government was less directly implicated, 
such as international Islamic solidarity (especially Palestine and Bosnia) and other moral or religious issues 
(such as the Monitor case in 1990). However, many of the activists from the groups considered in this article were 
also involved. They were instrumental in many demonstrations during the first wave of anti-SDSB protest in late 
1991 and also participated during the second wave in 1993. Indeed, during the course of the campaign in 1993 
there were frequent tensions between the Islamic activists and activists from the "social justice" groups, who 
considered the campaign to be expressed too much in religious terms and not sufficiently anti-government. This 
was vividly expressed in the November 10 demonstration which split in two, with only a minority of the most 
militant activists proceeding to the palace.
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testers were injudicious for attacking two competing powers at the same time.39 Following 
the first session of the trial of the twenty-one, a student activist remarked: "[In the court­
room] we shouted liang Suharto' and all of the military people there didn't touch us. If 
we'd insulted the military—we would have been wiped out (disikat)."
It may be tempting to speculate about these kinds of cases, in a "politics as wayang" vein, 
but it is difficult to draw clear conclusions from them about the character of tensions in the 
military and regime. Their significance for present purposes lies more in the fact that these 
and similar cases, as well as the kinds of informal contacts discussed earlier, have been 
widely interpreted by student activists as evidence of the existence of such tensions.
Student Attitudes to the Military
The way in which student activists interpret private approaches by military officers, and 
how they perceive conflict within the regime and attempt to take advantage of it, varies 
greatly between different individuals and groups. Attitudes on such matters are influenced 
by many factors—including the extent of personal contacts with military officers, and rela­
tions with particular groupings, networks, or individuals in elite dissident circles. But the 
debates which have taken place in this context do convey something of the kind of political 
outlooks prevalent in one section of the middle-class "opposition."
It is worth stressing at the outset that underlying their differences regarding strategic 
and tactical matters, a broad consensus exists amongst most activists from the kind of 
groups with which this article is concerned. They agree that one of their ultimate aims is the 
withdrawal of the military from political life. Unlike the situation in the 1970s, when the 
1966 coalition was a comparatively recent memory, the immediate historical backdrop of the 
present student movement is the much more hostile relationship between the military and 
students in the 1970s and early 1980s. Contemporary activists tend to believe that the 
students in 1966 helped disguise the military's rise to power, and they stress their determi­
nation not to repeat these earlier actions.40
39 See the interview with one of the twenty-one students, Yeni Damayanti, in Editor, April 28,1994. It is note­
worthy that press coverage of the arrests and trials (and, indeed, the trials themselves) has concentrated on the 
attacks the students made on Suharto, all but ignoring their criticisms of the military. For an interesting discus­
sion of this case and its implications concerning tensions in the regime, see Yosep Adi Prasetyo, "Penyidangan 21 
Aktivis Mahasiswa: Pergelaran Teater Kebangsaan," in Bina Darma 12,45 (1994): 101-19.
40 It should be noted, however, that those students who have so far engaged in protest and entered the strategic 
debates discussed below have been in the vanguard of middle class political activism—the risks which they have 
taken testifies to the fact that they are among those most vehemently opposed to the present regime. It is not 
surprising, then, that anti-military sentiment is strong among them. If the process of liberalization continues to 
unfold, it can be assumed that increasingly moderate political groupings, more willing to contemplate coopera­
tion with regime or military elements, will move into action. In the case of students, this applies especially to the 
cross-campus ormas, which up to the present have been extremely cautious about risking their large numbers, 
and instead argue privately that they are waiting for the appropriate "momentum." Indeed, there are indications 
that this process is beginning. It appears that increasing numbers of HMI students have recently been organizing 
and participating in demonstrations (although not under the name of HMI)—especially on SDSB and the 
Bapindo scandal. Or see, for example, an almost euphoric meeting in January 1994 between representatives of 
student senates—which tend to be dominated by ormas and have until recently been largely politically quies­
cent—and former Kodam Jaya commander Hendro Priyono to discuss, amongst other things, the December 14, 
1993 case. At the end of this meeting, Hendro (after he had promised extra visiting rights to the detained stu­
dents and given sports shoes to many of those in attendance) was raised up onto the students' shoulders as they 
shouted his praises: See Detik, February 2-8,1994.
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At one end of the spectrum of views amongst activist groups, there is absolute opposi­
tion to even contemplating collaboration with elements from within the military, and simi­
lar opposition to concentrating criticism on any one particular "elite faction," such as the 
Suharto camp. This is a common view especially among more "populist" groups—those 
activists who tend to work more consistently among workers and farmers and are hostile to 
"elite" issues (and are often located further from Jakarta, in Central and East Java). Those 
students who are more self-consciously radical like to describe the Indonesian political 
system as militarist or fascist. In the words of one, "the enemy of the people is not 'Suharto 
versus pro-democratic or anti-Suharto elements', but rather 'militarism versus the Indone­
sian people.'" In the clandestine material of the more radical groups, opposition to the 
military and to divifutigsi occupies a central position, although they are limited in the extent 
to which they can express this publicly. A conscious tactic at the campus level is to cam­
paign against the Menwa (student regiment), as a means to encourage anti-militarist 
sentiment among students.
There are also strong moral overtones in much of the opposition to "softness" toward 
the military. For many activists a simple moral principle is involved: military officers are 
part of the elite which represses the rakyat; they have been responsible for much bloody 
repression; and hence any idea of collaboration with them must be opposed. To do other­
wise would be to undermine students' moral integrity as a "pure" (murni) force, outside and 
independent of a tainted power structure. And so many groups which cannot be described 
as left-wing also tend to reject contact with the military, and refuse offers of military funds.
If they do accept a military invitation to dinner or an informal dialogue (and sometimes 
these invitations engender debate in groups about whether or not they should be accepted), 
they use it as an opportunity to underline their opposition to the military's political role.41
This kind of morally motivated opposition to conciliation with the military is part of the 
broadly populist outlook in the student movement, one element of which is extreme hostil­
ity to all forms of "elite politics." For example, a number of Surabaya students told me that 
they would not pursue any "elite" issue (the example being discussed was Sudomo's in­
volvement in the Bapindo banking scandal), because there was a possibility that their 
actions could be used by an opposing elite faction for its own advantage. Another group 
told me that they should not take up issues which are "too high level" (in contrast to local 
campus, farmer, or worker issues) because to do so is to risk being "eaten up by the elite." 
This hostility to the elite and their politics extends to leading dissenters. For example, stu­
dents who publicly nominated noted critic Ali Sadikin and retired general Mohammed 
Yusuf for president before the 1993 MPR session, were criticized in some circles for merely 
furthering the interests of one element of the elite.
These kinds of student activists, who deliberately strive to avoid elite politics, thus do 
not employ any specific stratagem to make use of the opportunities afforded by intra­
regime disunity. Rather, they simply continue to engage in political activity, deepen their 
organizing work, make increasingly bold and confrontational actions and demands, and, by 
doing so, strive to widen the space available for political action.
However, there are also a range of more conciliatory attitudes regarding the military 
among other student activists. In large part these attitudes reflect broad agreement among
41 One example was a February 25,1994 open dialogue with student activists and student senate representatives 
which was requested by the Commander of the East Java Territorial Command, Major General Haris Sudarno. 
Activists from FKMS used this opportunity to demonstrate their opposition to the "security approach" and to 
call for the dissolution of Bakorstanas: See Surya, February 25,1994.
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many in elite opposition circles—such as academics, NGO leaders, or retired generals—that 
it is a tactical error to target Suharto and the military simultaneously. And so, as a section of 
the student movement has moved away from the extreme margins of political life and be­
come closer to these circles, there has been something of a shift in the targets of their criti­
cism. In contrast to the late 1980s, when the focus was on land disputes and other local 
issues, in recent years, as described above, demonstrations directly targeted against Suharto 
have occurred. There is also an increasing focus on Suharto in student magazines and the 
anonymous leaflets and brochures which circulate among students.42
Behind the reemerging emphasis on Suharto are a range of considerations. Many stu­
dents, of course, are not motivated by tactical or theoretical considerations, but by simple 
moral reprehension—Suharto as president and embodiment of the New Order is a logical 
and obvious target for anti-regime vitriol. For other students, it is a simple question of not 
multiplying the movement's opponents unnecessarily, of avoiding repression. They con­
sider the risks entailed in a frontal assault on the military as too high and have noted that 
military elements appear to allow a certain—but by no means absolute—space for criticism 
of Suharto.
Other activists, however, are influenced by broader strategic considerations. For exam­
ple, it is sometimes argued that Suharto (rather than the military, as some ICMI intellectuals 
see it) is the main obstacle to democratization, who must be confronted first, and that it is 
impossible to envisage significant reform without Suharto's removal. They consider that 
focusing on Suharto would enable a broad opposition front to be built, and that only after 
his removal would it be possible realistically to make demands for changes in the political 
system or the structure of society. In the words of one activist: "How many times have we 
criticized the DPR for being unrepresentative and ineffective, as being a bunch of clowns 
[badut]? But it's been impossible to make any changes to it—because in the end it always 
comes back to Suharto." The same person described the focus on Suharto as an "entry 
point" for a struggle for structural change.
Indeed, in a movement which since the 1980s has been thoroughly imbued with the 
language of "structural change," Suharto himself is sometimes described as a structural 
obstacle by these students. One activist explained that it is false to counterpose Suharto to 
the "system," arguing that the system has become personalized, that the two are identical.
To remove Suharto is necessarily to change the system. Often this kind of approach is justi­
fied by describing the New Order as modem version of a traditional Javanese sultanate. 
Amongst many activists there is a—often half-joking—tendency to describe all social and 
political problems and injustices as being "because of Suharto." There is even an acronym to 
describe this concept: UUS—Ujung-ujung Suharto, which, roughly translated, means "some­
thing which can be traced back to Suharto."
And so there is one body of student activist opinion which argues that criticism of any 
political problem should be directed back to Suharto: all criticism should be "di-UUS-kan." 
This approach was most succinctly expressed by the sticker distributed at a November 1993 
anti SDSB demonstration: Soeharto: Dalang Segala Bencana: SDSB, Nipah, Haur Koneng, Dili, 
Tanjung Priok.43 (Nuku Suleiman, chairperson of Yayasan Pijar, was sentenced to five years'
42 For example, the first 1993 edition of the Yogyakarta Sunan Kalijaga IAIN student magazine Arena, which 
detailed the business interests of the Suharto family and was subsequently banned.
43 "Soeharto: Dalang o f  all disasters:. . Nipah and Haur Koneng refer to incidents where civilians were killed 
in Madura and West Java in 1993, Dili refers to the 1991 Santa Cruz massacre, and Tanjung Priok refers to a 
massacre in Jakarta's port district in 1984.
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imprisonment for distributing the sticker.) In the same way, anti-Suharto slogans are shout­
ed at a wide range of demonstrations, a protest against the "security approach" is used to 
call for the president's impeachment, and demonstrations concerning the Bapindo banking 
scandal are used to highlight Suharto's alleged personal involvement.44
This kind of approach has sparked a real debate amongst student activists, especially 
given the dominant populist flavor and emphasis on "structural" change in the movement 
since the 1980s. At a number of meetings I attended there was lively discussion of this topic, 
with some saying anti-Suharto students were playing into the hands of the military, that 
they were risking a repeat of 1966, and that they were, in effect, aiming only at a change in 
"person" rather than "structure."45 Comparisons were made with the replacement of 
Marcos in the Philippines, which radical students consider resulted in no meaningful struc­
tural change. The notion that Suharto himself constitutes a structural obstacle to democrati­
zation has been developed in response to such criticisms.
Another response has been that student activists and other regime critics can avoid 
being used by the military in this process by making use of the space afforded them by 
attacking Suharto in order to strengthen the organizational and mass base of their move­
ment, and to strengthen civil society more broadly. This is a common argument in broader 
dissident circles: that the only way to avoid military cooptation in the attack on Suharto is to 
build a strong base so that civilian forces may have greater bargaining power in a future 
process of regime change. This view is often implicitly (or explicitly) based on a gradualist 
and negotiation-centered conception of democratic transition.
In many respects a tactical alliance with discontented military elements would seem to 
be the logical next step for those students who advocate the anti-Suharto approach. (Indeed 
it could be argued that students who focus on Suharto are already in de-facto alliance.) Of 
course, the great many uncertainties which currently obscure the real dimensions of military 
discontent and intra-regime conflict, mean that any kind of open coalition is for the present 
out of the question. Nevertheless, there is an unfinished and ongoing debate on this matter, 
with many activists unsure of what position to take. At the present, however, most activists 
I interviewed—even those who argue in favor of focusing on Suharto—have strong feelings 
against collaboration with military elements. At a number of meetings I attended, where 
student activists discussed the question of strategic alliances, there was universal agreement 
that students should cooperate with workers and farmers. On whether the military, or ele­
ments within it were a potential ally, most views were extremely negative, with only a few 
students being even somewhat equivocal. Anti-militarist sentiment remains dominant in 
those activist groups which have organized many of the protests of recent years.
Conclusion
The relationship between intra-regime friction and civilian dissent, in this case student 
protest, is obviously complex. Clearly it is not a simple case of "encouragement" of student
44 See, for example, a poster carried by a demonstrator at a Bapindo demonstration, which is visible in a photo­
graph on p. 23 of Editor, March 3,1994: "Kasus Nuku, Kasus Ria lrawan, Kasus Bapindo, Semuanya UUS" (The 
Nuku, Ria lrawan, and Bapindo cases are all UUS). Nuku Suleiman was on trial at this time. Ria lrawan is a 
movie star linked to a scandal surrounding the death of a young businessman in Jakarta in early 1994. This 
scandal was the subject of much rumor in opposition circles concerning the possible involvement of a member of 
the presidential family.
45 Similar criticisms are made concerning FAMI's emphasis on Suharto in an article entitled "An Evaluation to 
Incident of December 141993" in Indonesian Mobilization (September 1993-January 1994, no 2), an English 
language newsheet produced by some of the more radical activists.
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activists by military elements. The dalang model of Indonesian politics might seem attractive 
in the framework of a patrimonial or cultural politics analysis, where politics are conceived 
in terms of conflict between factional appanage wielders, using vast patron-client pyramids 
extending out into civil society. However, at least in the upsurge of student protest which 
has taken place since the late 1980s, direct contact with military elements has been a minor 
factor. Although some groups might have been encouraged by their clandestine or informal 
contacts with the military, most activists—especially outside Jakarta where protest has been 
most intense—actually opposed such contacts in principle.
The relationship has been in the main more indirect. On one level, it is difficult to argue 
against (and certainly difficult to disprove) a "taking the lid off' explanation—that dissatis­
fied military elements have encouraged dissent by taking a softer approach to it. In particu­
lar cases, a surprisingly relaxed attitude has been apparent and there has been an overall 
softening over the entire period. But in many cases—especially those where students mobil­
ize alongside farmers or workers—repression has been just as brutal as in the old days. The 
relationship is obviously more complex, with dissenting groups attempting to read the char­
acter of regime friction and to take advantage of it by testing the boundaries of military tol­
eration of dissent (a process which has involved significant risk and considerable bravery).
It is thus important not to downplay the independent role played by dissenting civilian 
groups in this process. It may be a semantic point, but groups in civil society require little 
"encouragement" to protest and dissent. There is clearly widespread dissatisfaction among 
educated middle class youth and in the lower classes (which to some extent has been articu­
lated by students). Student activist groups, although they may be relatively inexperienced, 
are independent political actors, who are—as the discussion above indicates—engaged in 
very real debates, making difficult choices on tactical and strategic matters. They are not 
merely the passive tools of elite factions, and, like other groups in civil society, they have 
played a significant role in pushing forward the liberalization process over the last seven or 
so years, not least by re-institutionalizing public protest as a normal feature of political life 
and by raising a number of issues to the public agenda—particularly land disputes, human 
rights violations, and labor issues. In the process, they have challenged and often over­
stepped the limits of toleration by the repressive apparatus of the state.
This is not to deny that, up to the present and on the whole, the state, including its mili­
tary component, has been the ultimate arbiter of the liberalization process. Ruling elements 
may have been pushed some way further in the keterbukaan process than they wished, but 
not to the extent that their interests have been significantly threatened. Similarly, frictions in 
the regime have not deepened into the kind of fissures which would provide a decisive 
opening for oppositional groupings in civil society. In coming years, a key will be the extent 
to which civilian forces are able to make use of the space provided by this process to organ­
ize politically in an effective manner. To the present, dissenting groups have largely been 
unable to do this. There have been a wide variety of initiatives, and certainly in the NGO 
field regime critics have a strong institutional base, although not one ideally suited for 
political campaigning. Initiatives taken by elite opposition and critical elements to broaden 
and organize a support base, particularly FPKR (Forum Pemumian Kedaulatan Rakyat: the 
Forum for the Purification of Peoples' Sovereignty) and Forum Demokrasi have largely 
stagnated. The student movement remains disunited and on the whole poorly organized. 
One recent and potentially important initiative at the populist end of the opposition spec­
trum was the formation of the Democratic People's Allaince (PRD), but this organization is 
still small.
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An important development indicated by the debates among students discussed above is 
the emergence of a new mood amongst sections of educated youth activists. Sentiments of 
acute hostility to the military, and to the elite as a whole, as well as the posing of mass 
organizing as an explicit alternative to collaboration with elite groups, all reflect populist 
and sometimes even revolutionary urges in a part of the student movement. An embryonic 
left is clearly reemerging in Indonesian politics, although it remains small. More broadly, 
the anti-militarism and radicalism of student politics also reflects a process of deepening 
alienation from the regime—not only on the part of student activists but also in broader 
layers of society. A range of social problems which have been engendered and exacerbated 
by the growth and spread of capitalism under the New Order—contradictions between city 
and country, developers and farmers, workers and capital—underlie this alienation.
On the other hand, there are plenty of counter-indications. Counterposed to the more 
populist mood of one wing of the student movement are more gradualist and reforming 
outlooks, in the tradition of the "moral force" and regularizing movements of the 1970s. 
These students see themselves in terms of pressure-group politics or as a social control. 
Despite an overlay of harsh anti-regime and anti-military sentiment, there is a clear logical 
dynamic amongst some students in the direction of a potential coalition with military ele­
ments. Certainly, the military remains the most powerful institution in Indonesia, with the 
greatest capacity to control the transition to the post-Suharto era. However, moves toward 
an alliance between a section of student activists and elements from the military are compli­
cated by not only the inconclusive and uncertain character of intra-regime friction, but also 
by a strong anti-militarism which did not exist amongst potential allies of the military in 
1965-1966.
